ABSTRACT
Introduction
The issue of intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection is gaining worldwide importance as economies move increasingly towards knowledge-based activities (Fink and Braga, 1999) . Furthermore, the attention paid by trade economists to IPRs issues has recently increased especially after the inclusion of the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in the system of the World Trade Organization (Qui and Yu, 2010) . Indeed, for the last two decades, the nature of linkages between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and international trade flows has been a source of much debate and controversy (Awokuse et al., 2010; Lerner, 2009 ).
The debate is stimulated by the mixed empirical results of the effects of level of intellectual property rights on trade flows (Ivus, 2010) .
The tension over strengthening IPRs stem from the fact that knowledge is nonrival in consumption (Arrow, 1962) and hence should be available free, but to produce such goods in the first place sufficient incentives need to be given to the innovators by way of intellectual property protection. As IPRs related laws differ across countries, it is of considerable interest from policy perspective to learn how changing the IPRs policies across countries or harmonizing them through multilateral initiatives, affect the cross country flow of goods and services that are embedded with invisible intellectual property element. Although there are a number of studies that have analysed the links between their protection and economic welfare, economic growth, innovations, FDI, and technology transfer 2 a little empirical work has been done to directly investigate the relationship between export response and the IPRs protection in the destination countries.
Therefore, this study contributes to the existing literature by providing empirical evidence on the effects of the IPRs strength on bilateral exports of Australia. Furthermore, the study introduces a threat of imitation variable based on the research and development expenditure of the importers and interact this variable with the IPRs standard of the importers to empirically evaluate if the imitation threats in the destination countries matter for Australian exports. These issues have been investigated after controlling for the gravity related variables of trade and the country development status of the importers.
The organization of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 explains the link between intellectual property rights (IPRs), threat of imitation and trade flows.
Empirical specification, methods and data are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results and analysis. The conclusions and some policy considerations are presented in the final section of the paper.
IPRs, Threat of Imitation and Trade Flows: A Link
The existing IPRs literature has identified two key channels through which status of the IPRs protection in a destination country affects the behaviour of foreign exporting firms when exporting to the destination country. The first of these is the "market expansion effect", and the second is the "market power effect". These effects explain how foreign exporting firms might react to a change of IPRs in an importing destination country. The market expansion effect is defined as a case in which strong foreign IPRs protection expands exports markets by ensuring exclusive rights to sell in the protected exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995) . An exporting firm may be expected to increase its sales (exports) to an importing country with strong IPRs protection and thereby expand its market for two reasons. Firstly, the exclusive rights provided to its exported goods through such strong protection reduce the capacity of local firms in a destination country to imitate the imported goods. The result is that the demand faced by the exporting firm is effectively shifted outward and larger sales volumes ensue. Secondly, strong IPRs protection in a destination country reduces the potential cost that may otherwise be incurred by foreign exporting firms in that it prevents the possible loss of their technologies to firms in the destination country.
Such costs may include foregone revenues from reduced exports due to the availability of imitated products and the added burden of making products more difficult to reproduce 3 (Smith, 1999 (Smith, , 2002 Taylor, 1993) .
Alternatively, a foreign exporting firm may choose to react negatively to the strong IPRs protection in a destination country by restricting the quantity of its exports and increasing the unit price. This is known as the "market power effect" (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995) . There are also two reasons for a foreign exporting firm reacting negatively to strong IPRs protection in a destination country. Firstly, the market power that arises from such protection in an importing country causes the elasticity of demand facing the exporting firm to decrease. As a result, the exporting firm may choose to decrease its exports and increase its unit price in order to profit from the increased monopoly rents. Secondly, strong IPRs protection in an importing country raises the cost of imitation for local firms. It also raises their marginal cost because of measures required to avoid detection by the relevant regulatory authorities.
Here, too, the exporting firm is encouraged to act monopolistically by reducing its exports to the destination country (Smith 1999 (Smith , 2002 .
It is also possible that strong IPRs change the preference structure of MNCs in favour of licensing and FDI activities and reduce incentive for direct arm's length exporting. Ferrantino (1993) shows that, countries with strong IPRs act to increase economic distance and thereby reduce international trade flows. However, the author finds transfer exports or export from parent to affiliate firms to rise in countries with weak IPRs. This finding weakens the argument that strong patent protection in the developing countries helps to protect the interest of the developed country firms and workers, especially when the cost of technology transfer from the parent to foreign affiliates is higher. Strong IPRs policies in the developing countries are likely to lead to vertical disintegration of the foreign firms. From the perspective of the developing countries, intra-firm trade among foreign firms may not be desirable in that it may involve tax-evasion through transfer pricing.
The market power and market expansion effects seem to offset each other; therefore, no clear theoretical prediction can be made about the impacts on the direction of trade in a world of varying IPRs protection regimes. All that can be 3 The case in which exports of a firm are the consequence of strong IRPs protection in a destination country and the associated reduction in private expenditures to deter imitation by firms in a destination country is known as a cost-reduction effect (Taylor, 1993) .
inferred from the existing theory is that the pattern of a country's exports across importing countries depends on the relative importance of these two effects (Smith, 1999 (Smith, , 2002 Rafiquzzaman, 2002; Yang and Huang, 2009; Kazutaka,, 2012) .
Moreover, changes in the IPRs policies in the destination countries affect the behaviour of multinational firms in terms of their mode of serving the export market (Ferrantino, 1993 Findlay and Song (1996) also analyse bilateral trade potential between Australia and china and argue that future bilateral trade between these two countries would continue to be driven by each country's comparative advantage. Sheng and Song (2008) examines the determinants of bilateral trade between Australia and China at the two digit commodity levels and demonstrate that current bilateral trade between these countries tends to promote the welfare of both countries in terms of generating more value added from exports. The most recent study conducted by Rahman (2012) demonstrates that Australia's bilateral trade is affected positively by economic size, per capita GDP, openness and common language, and negatively by the distance between the trading partners. The author also
show that Australia has tremendous trade potential with Singapore, Argentina, the Russian Federation, Portugal, Greece, Chile, the Philippines, Norway, Brazil and Bangladesh. Whether this potential will still exist after imposing strong IPRs regime or their imitation threat status is certainly an interesting area of research.
The aforementioned discussion leads us to conclude that the question of whether strong IPRs in the importing countries would lead to increased imports or not from their import sources is a purely empirical question that can be answered through the empirical investigation only. In this regard, Australia is a suitable case study.
Since the IPRs index covers among others the patentability of foods, plant and animal varieties, and Australia is a major exporter of these items, it is worthwhile to know how the varying strengths of the IPRs policies in the export market affects her export flows. Moreover, as both the developed and the developing countries, holding a wide spectrum of IPRs policies, are Australia's trading partners, the result obtained from the analysis will have more general applicability.
Data, Methodology and Empirical Specification
The study utilizes data from Australia's all trading partners over the period 1995 to 
The term 
is the annual export of country i (here Australia) to its trading partner j in year t. The basic gravitational variables that appear as independent variables in this study are market sizes of the trading partners (Y it and Y jt ) and the geographical distances between them (D ij ). The theoretical gravity model dictates what variables should be included in the model and how they need to be measured. As a guideline, Shephard (2012) suggests that the dependent variable should be the log of bilateral exports, not total trade, and GDPs be measured in nominal terms, not in real terms. The two unobserved multilateral price terms, P i and Π j , included in the model effectively deflate the data. It is not even appropriate to include the observed price indices in the model. Two categorical variables have been created to examine how their various levels affect the Australian exports, and how they interact with the IPRs of the importers in modifying the response of these export flows. The first one is the imitation threat with two levels: strong and weak. It is believed that countries that spend more on research have better capabilities to make counterfeit products. To discover if there is any threshold point in the R&D expenditure beyond which countries are in the strong imitative ability group, the following regression equation is fitted:
where  is the regime switching point in the research and expenditure variable 
Empirical Results and Analysis
For analysing the effect of the IPRs protection and its potential interaction with the imitation threat status of the importers, model (2) has been estimated first without the imitation threat dummy (Model 2a) and then with the imitation threat dummy (Model 2b). The empirical results from these two models are reported in Table 2 (Schneider, 2005) supporting research and development activities in the developing countries by the developed world can result in a win-win situation.
Conclusion
An explicit econometric analysis of the relationship between the level of intellectual property rights, imitation threat, income status, and bilateral export flows from Australia to her trading partners has been performed, and the notion that the level of intellectual property rights stimulate bilateral export flows from Australia has been supported. In particular, the results show that stronger IPRs regimes irrespective of imitation threat make commodities more tradable, as far as the Australian exports are concerned. The results are based on about 830 observations on Australia's trading partners, spread over four cross sections, and should be credible.
Positive relationship between the IPRs in the importing country and the exports flows to that country has important policy implications for reducing knowledge gaps between the developed and the developing countries. Instead of letting the developing countries follow the learning-by-imitating strategy, in a lax
IPRs environment, knowledge transfer should take place through direct technical assistance. Countries that are beneficiaries of the strong IPRs regime can share their gains by allowing the affected countries increased market access through special tariff concessions like the generalized system of preferences. This will make the goal of achieving higher IPRs standard and increased export flow simultaneously easier.
Alternatively, technology transfer can take place through increased FDI activities and building institution (research and training) to enhance the absorptive capacity of the host countries.
The study is, however, Australia focused and based on aggregate trade data that might conceal various response patterns to property rights reform depending on industry categories. Future research in this area can replicate similar analysis based on more extensive datasets and use industry-specific data, which will help to check whether the results of the present study are representative. Another important dimension of the IPRs policy changes, namely, its effects on the welfare of the source and destination countries or the world as a whole, was not covered in the study.
Obviously, there are payoffs from directing future research attention in this highly debated area of the intellectual property protection.
